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On 6 May 2020, the National Assembly for Wales (hereafter “the Assembly”) will officially 
be renamed, adopting the new title of Senedd Cymru / Welsh Parliament. The change comes 
as a result of section 9 of the Wales Act 2017, amending the Government of Wales Act 2006 
(hereafter “GOWA”) to include the new section 111A which transfers to the Assembly the 
power to legislate on matters relating to its electoral and operational arrangements. 
The new powers transferred under the 2017 Act were in keeping with recommendations made 
in Part II of the Silk Commission Report (R.53) and included in the St. David’s Day 
Agreement, as well as also reflecting some similar provisions implemented in Scotland under 
the Scotland Act 2016. Under section 111A Government of Wales Act GOWA, the Assembly 
may now, by way of a two-thirds supermajority, pass legislation on protected subject-matter 
relating to the name, franchise or operation of the Assembly. 
The first attempt at legislation under the new powers took form in the Senedd and Elections 
(Wales) Bill which was introduced into the Assembly in February 2019. After a number 
of passionate debates in the Assembly, the Bill met the supermajority requirement in a vote on 
27 November 2019, receiving royal assent on 15 January 2020. The terms of the new Senedd 
and Elections (Wales) Act 2020 see Wales become the second part of the UK, after Scotland, 
to extend the franchise to 16 and 17 year olds in devolved elections. Further, as already noted, 
the Act also changes the name of the legislature in Wales, a change which the explanatory 
memorandum details was designed ‘to better reflect the evolution of its constitutional status, 
to the national parliament that it is today’. Developing this final point, we turn now to evaluate 
the constitutional position of Wales within the territorial constitution. 
Devolution in Wales: A Process, Not an Event 
It is now a well-practiced adage that devolution is a ‘process, not an event’. Nowhere has this 
reality been reflected more than in Wales. Over the past two decades, Westminster has enacted 
two Government of Wales Acts (1998 and 2006) and two Wales Acts (2014 and 2017). In 
addition, there have also been multiple reports on devolution in Wales, including the Richard 
Commission (2002-2004), the Holtham Commission (2008-2010) and the Silk 
Commission Part I and Part II (2011-2014). The result has seen devolution in Wales transition 
from a conferred powers model with initially only minor secondary legislative authority, 
through to a reserved powers model with full primary law-making powers. 
Despite changes that have deepened devolution in Wales, the level of legislative competence 
currently enjoyed by the Assembly remains below that of Scotland or Northern Ireland. In 
particular, the existence of separate legal systems in Scotland and Northern Ireland provides 
for a much broader range of legislative competence in private law and criminal law matters 
than is currently enjoyed in Wales. Moreover, the devolution settlement in Wales has so far 
also failed to receive tax and spending powers equal to that of Scotland. 
In part, the asymmetrical spread of competences across the three devolution settlements reflects 
the ad hoc system of devolution in the UK, which has tended to favour political pragmatism 
and tailored bilateral arrangements over a holistic approach to devolution across the UK. The 
consequence for Wales has been a more limited form of devolution than seen in Scotland or 
Northern Ireland, though consistently above the absence of legislative devolution in England. 
The historic relationship with England has also constrained the scope of devolution in Wales. 
More than Scotland or Northern Ireland, the history of Wales is closely linked to England in 
terms of its economic development, local governance, education and healthcare systems. 
Moreover, since the sixteenth century, the legal system in Wales has been joined to England in 
the shared England and Wales jurisdiction. 
Addressing this last point, the recent report by the Thomas Commission on Justice in Wales 
recommended the ending of the single England and Wales legal jurisdiction and the devolution 
of powers on policing, prisons and the judicial system. Formally, the UK Government’s 
response has been to not support the devolution of justice powers to Wales. Responding to the 
report, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, Chris Philip, offered the conclusion that the 
high number of matters reserved to the UK Government under the Wales Act 2017 precludes 
the need for a devolution of justice matters. Indeed, the opinion offered by Philip was that the 
devolution of justice powers would exacerbate the “jagged edge” between UK and Welsh 
competences (for further detail on the “jagged edge” of devolution in Wales, see the reports by 
the Thomas Commission and the Wales Governance Centre. A useful discussion is also 
undertaken in a previous blog by Daniel Wincott). 
Wales Act 2017 
The most recent Westminster legislation to alter the devolution settlement in Wales came 
through the Wales Act 2017. Under the Act, the system of devolution in Wales moved from a 
conferred to a reserved powers model, with the Assembly also receiving additional 
competences, including on financial matters. However, while offering an important milestone 
in the devolution process in Wales, commentary on the Act has tended to focus on criticism of 
the potential restrictions imposed by the long list of reserved powers included under the new 
GOWA Schedule 7A. The contested shortcomings may be summarised under two headings. 
First, the number of matters detailed as reserved to Westminster under Schedule 7A raises 
procedural questions on the logic underpinning its enactment. In the UK Government’s white 
paper to the draft Wales Bill, the move to a reserved powers model was justified as resetting 
devolution in Wales to provide clarity and consistency on the scope and operation of the 
Assembly. A significant influence in the calls for clarity and coherence was to reduce the 
confusion surrounding the scope of devolved competence associated with the old section 108 
GOWA, thus reducing the need for references to be made to the UK Supreme Court. 
Under the reserved powers model now in place, Schedule 7A lists nearly two hundred matters 
as reserved to Westminster. The new section 108A then details that a legislative provision falls 
outside of the competence of the Assembly should it ‘relate to’ a reserved matter. This creates 
a number of unknowns. On the one hand, the high number of reserved matters risks limiting 
the scope of legislative competence. As the Supreme Court established in Agricultural Sector 
(Wales) Bill, under the conferred powers model an Act of the Assembly would fall within 
legislative competence if it ‘fairly and realistically’ related to a devolved matter, even if parts 
of the provision related to a subject that had not been devolved (a so-called ‘silent’ subject). 
Under the new reserved powers model in Wales, this expansive elasticity in the legislative 
competence of the Assembly risks being lost, and the scope of silent subjects being 
significantly reduced by the number of subjects listed as explicitly reserved. An example being 
the previous silent subject of employment relations which has now been reserved, with the only 
exception being provisions relating to the subject matter of the Agricultural Sector (Wales) Act 
2014.  
On the other hand, the new principle under section 108A(2) that provisions relating to matters 
listed in Schedule 7A fall outside of legislative competence risks narrowing the scope of 
legislative competence further, following the standard established by Lord Hope in Imperial 
Tobacco – i.e. that there is not an automatic presumption of legislative competence. 
Consideration of these points does little to increase the clarity or coherence of legislative 
competence in Wales. While reference to the Supreme Court has not yet been made on the 
legislative competence of the Assembly under the new reserved powers model, it appears to 
only be a matter of time. 
Second, the Act has also proved problematic in highlighting the continuation of the more 
limited scope of devolution in Wales in comparison to Scotland or Northern Ireland. 
Recognition of this point was noted by the House of Lords Constitution Committee in 
its report on the then draft Wales Bill, a report which echoed points previously made by the 
Welsh Assembly Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee (now the Legislation, 
Justice and Constitution Committee). More recently, in its 2019 white paper, Reforming our 
Union, the Welsh Government raised an important consideration on the wider constitutional 
reasoning underpinning the allocation of devolved competences:  
The arguments for recognition of the subsidiarity principle is not of course to seek 
identical settlements for each of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, but it does 
require that differences between the settlements should be capable of rational 
justification. 
Investigating this point from a UK-wide perspective, the 2018 report by the House of Commons 
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Devolution and Exiting the EU, 
offered a similar reasoning on the need for justification and accountability of the UK 
Government on the asymmetrical model of devolution in the UK. 
Finally, there also exists a wider normative point on the apparently competing mind-sets 
between the UK and Welsh administrations in their understanding of the purpose and direction 
of devolution. It is apparent from the number of matters reserved under the 2017 Act that the 
UK Government has not subscribed to the arguments made by the Welsh Government on the 
need for clarity and a model of devolution rooted in the principles of subsidiarity. Moreover, 
the two administrations have also recently experienced a number of constitutional flash points 
in relation to the interpretation and operation of the Sewel Convention in the Brexit process, a 
matter which has not been discussed in this short blog but which continues to factor heavily in 
the politics of devolution.  
Conclusion 
Historically, the unique complexity and limited scope of devolution in Wales was in part 
answered by the lower levels of popular support or politicised civil society to justify further 
devolution. The upcoming change of name of the Assembly captures that Wales has evolved 
significantly as a devolved polity since then and now occupies a permanent and important 
position in the UK territorial constitution. 
The prospect of additional transfers of competences to Wales is an issue that the newly named 
Senedd will likely be keen to address. In recent months, calls for further devolution have been 
made consistently, as well as the publication of the report by the Thomas Commission calling 
for the devolution of justice powers, these include calls for full powers over rail 
transportation and a Welsh Assembly consultation on broadcasting powers. While the current 
UK Government seems to have little appetite to transfer additional powers to Wales, the notion 
of devolution as a process looks set to continue over the coming years. 
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